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DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE AND DERIVATIVE
SUIT SETTLEMENTS
Although state corporation statutes vest the power to manage the
affairs of a corporation in a board of directors,' that power is often
circumscribed when board members are named as defendants in a
stockholder's derivative Suit.2 In Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial
Corp. ,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that a non-independent board of directors does not have the power to
settle a stockholder's derivative suit.4 Rule 23.15 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires court approval of settlements of derivative
suits. 6 Until Clark, courts readily approved such settlements7 as long
1. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1977); DEf. CODE AN. tit..8, § 141(a) (Supp.
1980).
2. When a court allows a stockholder to maintain a derivative suit, see infra notes 63-68 and
accompanying text, the corporation is required to retain counsel independent of its board of
directors. See, e.g., Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Messing v. FDI, Inc., 439
F. Supp. 776 (D.NJ. 1977); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp, 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. I11. 1975),
aft'din relevantfpart, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co, 218 F. Supp.-238
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). See generally Note, Independent Representation For Corporate Defendants in
Derivative Suits, 74 YALE L.. 524 (1965). Furthermore, both legislatures and courts have limited
the defenses a corporation may interpose on behalf of its board members implicated in a
derivative suit. Both the Delaware and the California statutes deal with indemnification of a
corporate agent for expenses incurred in successfully defending against claims. 'See Otis & Co. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944), aft'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); see also
Colan v. Monumental Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1023 (N.D. IML 1981); Washington, Stockholders'
Derivative Suits: The Company's Role and a Suggestion, 25 CORNELL L. Q. 361 (1940); Note,
Defenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits-Who May Raise Them, 66 HARV. L. REv. 342 (1952).
3. 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981) (Clark II). The Fifth
Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's approval of a derivative settlement proposal. 79
F.R.D. 641 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (Clark I).
4. Clark //, 625 F.2d at 53-54. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
5. Rule 23.1 provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders... to enforce a right of a
corporation. . . the corporation... having failed to enforce a right which may prop-
erly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (I) that the plaintiff
was a shareholder... at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his
share... devolved on him by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive
one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise
have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the ejors, if any, made by the
vlainiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors .. . and the reasons for his
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The derivative action may not
be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the shareholders ... similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corpora-
tion .... The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders
... in such manner as the court directs. (emphasis added)
6. This note concerns only settlement agreements that are brought before a court for
approval pursuant to Rule 23.1. Whether a suit may be settled without judicial approval, as
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as the proposed agreement was not tainted by fraud or collusion and
the terms constituted a "fair, adequate and reasonable" recovery for
the corporation relative to the strengths and weaknesses of its legal
claims.8 The Clark court's holding, however, precludes a non-
independent board from settling the suit even if the proposed terms are
fair, adequate and reasonable.9
The Clark court reached its holding by relying on cases
concerning excuse of the demand requirement, finding a "parity of
reasoning" between those cases and settlement cases. Rule 23.110 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the starting point for the law
concerning demand requirements. It requires a stockholder, before
filing a derivative suit,II to demand that the board of directors pursue
redress of the claim on the corporation's behalf.'2 Failure to make this
allowed in Wolfv. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965), is beyond the
scope of this note. The Wolf holding has been criticized because it disregards the strong public
policies favoring judicial supervision of the derivative settlement process, a process fraught with
the potential for abuse. See, e.g., Comment, Compromise of Derivative Claims by a Corporation
Jf7thout CourtApproval, 52 VA. L. REV. 342 (1966).
7. Cases involving the settlement of derivative suits freely include citations to cases
concerning settlements of class actions and bankruptcy proceedings, and vice versa. See, e.g.,
Clark II, 625 F.2d at 54. This note follows this practice. The Clark II court cited Miller v.
Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977), a class action, which in turn cited
Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968), a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding. 559
F.2d at 429. Protectie Comm was also cited in Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir.
1972), a derivative suit. See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485-86 n.16 (1979); Newman v.
Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 692 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972).
8. See infra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
9. See infia text accompanying notes 99-103. See C7rk 11, 625 F.2d at 54.
10. For the text of rule 23.1, see supra note 5.
11. In a stockholder's derivative suit, the complaining stockholder is the party that litigates a
corporation's alleged cause of action. Although the corporation on behalf of which a derivative
suit is brought is a nominal defendant, it is in fact the real party in interest; any recovery from a
derivative suit generally goes to the aggrieved corporation. See, e.g., Pittston Co. v. Reeves, 263
F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1959); Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Haudek, The Settlement and Dismral ofSgtockholders'Actions-P1art I, 22 Sw. LJ. 763, 763-75
(1968).
Shareholders may also sue to recover for any direct injury they may have suffered as a result
of a violation of their legal rights as shareholders. The distinction between direct and derivative
suits is often problematic. See Note, Distinguishing Between Direct and Derivative Shareholder
Suits, 110 U. PA. L. RE,. 1147 (1962). Although derivative suits may involve claims against
persons or corporations unassociated with members of a corporation's board of directors, this note
examines only those derivative suits that allege claims against members of the corporation's board
or against other entities in which board members have a pecuniary or other tangible interest. In
such cases, the board members stand in a "dual relation" to the transactions giving rise to the
derivative suit. See infra note 16.
12. The demand may request redress outside of the judicial system, such as a change in
corporate policy to prevent future wrongdoing. This note, however, is concerned only with
demands that the board pursue judicial redress of the corporation's alleged legal claim. See
generally .Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U.
Cm. L. REv. 168 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Demand and Standing Requirements]; Note,
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demand bars the stockholder from maintaining the suit13 unless the
court excuses the demand requirement. 14 The court will excuse the
requirement when a sufficient number of members of a board of
directors' 5 are not independent of the transactions giving rise to the
suit.16
This note examines the Clark opinion 17 and reviews the
underlying rationale of cases concerning excuse of the demand
requirement.'8 The note then examines the derivative suit settlement
process19 and the traditional legal standards for judicial approval of a
proposed settlement.20 The note concludes that even though there are
similarities between demand requirement cases and settlement cases,
differences between the demand requirement and the settlement
processes2' indicate that the "parity of reasoning" relied on by the
Clark court does not exist.
I. CLAx v. LOMAS & NE77"LETON FINANCIAL CoRP.
The Clark case arose from the conduct of Lomas and Nettleton
Financial Corporation (LNFC), NCS Computer Corporation, and
Booth, Inc., concerning several mergers. In 1969, LNFC acquired con-
trol of NCS, allegedly to "dismantle" NCS for its own benefit.22 In
Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REv. 746
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Note, Demand on Directors].
13. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has characterized the
.stockholder derivative suit as two causes of action: it is an action against the corporation for
refusing to take those steps demanded by the stockholder, and it is an action against those whom
the stockholder alleges are responsible for the violation of the corporation's legal rights. See Ross
v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 452-53 (1881); Note, The
Busness Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 .CORNELL L. REV. 600, 603-08
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Business Judgment Rule]; Note, Demandon Directors, supra note
12, at 748.
14. See in./ra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
16. In United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917), the
Supreme Court stated:
[w]hether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action for
damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management
and is left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of instruction by vote of the
stockholders. Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires the corpora-
tion, except where the directors are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust,
or where they stand in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judge-
me.t....
Id at 263-64 (emphasis added).
17. See infra notes 22-53 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 81-120 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 121-140 and accompanying texL
22. Clark II, 625 F.2d at 50.
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1972, LNFC agreed with Booth, Inc. that Booth would merge with
NCS; NCS survived the merger, but operated under the Booth name.23
Following this merger, former shareholders of NCS filed suit, both in a
direct action in their personal capacity and in a derivative action on
behalf of Booth,24 alleging that LNFC had committed securities laws
violations prior to the NCS-Booth merger.25 The plaintiffs also at-
tacked this merger in an amended complaint.
Three years later, the plaintiffs again successfully sought leave to
amend their complaint, this time in order to name several additional
defendants, including Jack Booth, who was then president, director,
and the largest stockholder of Booth, Inc.2 6 Prior to this amendment of
the complaint, Booth, Inc. had not opposed the suit; it had only an-
swered that the court should award it any recovery the suit might pro-
duce.27 When confronted with the plaintiffs' attempt to join the
corporation's largest stockholder, however, the corporation's board of
directors began actively to oppose the suit.28
At the request of the district court, the plaintiffs, the defendants,
and the corporate counsel of Booth, Inc. began negotiations to settle
both the derivative and the direct claims.29 When the negotiators failed
to reach an agreement to settle all of the claims, the district court rec-
ommended that the parties negotiate to settle only the derivative
claims.30 The plaintiffs refused to participate in such negotiations.31
23. Id at 51.
24. The plaintiffs in Clark were former shareholders of NCS who had attempted to use the
action to obtain a class recovery on behalf of the shareholders of NCS "as it existed prior to its
merger with Old Booth." Booth would not have been entitled to recovery from such an action;
any recompense would have gone instead to the individual stockholders comprising the proposed
class. The district court ruled, however, that there was no such entity as "NCS as it existed prior
to its merger with Old Booth"; that although the plaintiffs were asserting direct claims and could
recover individually, they could not recover on behalf of a class of shareholders of an entity that
did not exist; and that the action was thus derivative in nature and any recovery therefrom, apart
from the plaintiffs' direct claims, was to inure to New Booth. See Clark 1, 79 F.R.D. at 643-48; see
also supra note 11.
25. 625 F.2d at 51. The events giving rise to the securities claims are murky at best. See
Clark.', 79 F.R.D. at 643.
26. Clark 11, 625 F.2d at 51. See h£'ja note 37 and accompanying text. Jack Booth was the
only member of the Booth board who was a defendant to the suit. Clark 1, 79 F.R.D. at 650.
27. The Fifth Circuit interpreted Booth's answer that any recovery from the suit should inure
to it as "neutral" See Clark II, 625 F.2d at 51. However, in view of the plaintiffs' attempts to
recover on behalf of NCS as it existed prior to its merger with Booth, it is more accurate to state
that Booth's answer was in opposition to any recovery that would not inure to it. See supra note
24.
28. The Booth board first unsuccessfully sought to deny the complaining shareholders leave
to amend and laterjoined with the newly named defendants in an unsuccessful attempt to dismiss
the counts against them. Clark II, 625 F.2d at 51.
29. See Clark II, 625 F.2d at 51; Ca*k I, 679 F.R.D. at 645, 652; supra note 11.
30. See Clark 1, 79 F.R.D. at 645.
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Apparently, Booth, Inc. and the defendants then continued without the
plaintiffs and agreed to settle the derivative claims.32 Pursuant to Rule
23.1, the corporation presented the derivative settlement agreement to
the district court for approval.33 The plaintiffs asserted that the district
court should not approve the proposed compromise because the board
of Booth, Inc., which ratified the settlement, was not independent and
was subject to conflicts of interest.34
The district court in Clark rejected the plaintiffs' contentions. The
court found the directors of the Booth, Inc. to be independent35 because
a majority of the board members had been appointed subsequent to the
transactions giving rise to the suit, and because Jack Booth was the
only board member who was a named defendant. 36 The court rejected
the argument that, by itself, the fact that Jack Booth and LNFC owned
more than fifty percent of the stock of Booth, Inc. and could therefore
elect and remove directors at will meant that the board could not be
independent. 37 Furthermore, the court found no evidence to support
31. See id at 645,652. In part, it was the plaintiffs' refusal to participate in limited settlement
negotiations that led the district court to conclude that "[t]he plaintiffs were not at all times acting
in the best interests of the corporation." Id at 656.
32. This summary of the settlement negotiations is drawn from both Clark I and Clark I".
See Clark II, 625 F.2d at 51; Clark 1, 79 F.R.D. at 645. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit noted only
that the settlement agreement proposed to the district court was negotiated without the presence or
knowledge of the plaintiffs. See Clark!H, 625 F.2d at 51. Apparently the Fifth Circuit was una-
ware that the district court had called for negotiations between all parties and that the plaintiffs
had refused to settle the derivative claims alone.
33. Rule 23.1 also requires that notice of the settlement proposal be given to the stockholders
of the aggrieved corporation. See supra note 5. After receiving such notice, no shareholders of
Booth, Inc., other than the plaintiffs, objected to the proposed settlement. Clark 1, 79 F.R.D. at
649.
Apparently as an extension of their attempts to recover on behalf of the shareholders of
"NCS as it existed prior to its merger with Old Booth," see xpra note 24, the plaintiffs also sought
to have notice sent to the former shareholders of NCS. See Clark 1, 79 F.R.D. at 646-49.
34. The plaintiffs also argued that the settlement proposal was not fair, adequate, and reason-
able; that there was fraud and collusion in the negotiations; and that notice of the settlement
proposal should have been sent to the former shareholders of NCS. They also maintained that the
law firm representing Booth, Inc. in the suit had a conflict of interest that required its disqualifica-
tion. Clark!, 79 F.R.D. at 649. The district court rejected all of the plaintiff' contentions. See id
at 646-53; Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 658 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (separate
opinion); see also hnfra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
35. Clark 1, 79 F.R.D. at 650.
36. Id at 649. The district court required that a disinterested majority of the Booth, Inc.
board approve the proposed compromise. See id at 645. According to Booth, Inc. the seven
member board that ratified the settlement consisted of five "outsiders" and only two "insiders."
Defendant/Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, at 7 n.8. Fur-
thermore, Jack Booth was excluded from the meeting at which the Booth, Inc. board ratified the
proposal. Clark !, 79 F.R.D. at 649.
37. Clark 1, 79 F.RD. at 649. The Booth, Inc. charter forbade cumulative voting. Jack
Booth owned approximately 45% of the then outstanding common stock; LNFC owned approxi-
mately 11%. Thus, it was undisputed that each'member of the board of Booth, Inc. held his
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the plaintiffs' claim that the settlement negotiations were collusive.38
After determining that the proposed compromise was fair, adequate,
and reasonable, the court approved the settlement terms.39
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
district court's analysis of the independence of the Booth, Inc. board
"simply does not* address appellants' main point, which is that Jack
Booth's and LNFC's combined shareholdings may have influenced the
settlement terms."''  The court stated that it must first decide whether
or not the board of Booth, Inc. had authority to settle the corporation's
legal claims.41 The court held that although a board of directors does
possess such authority, it can only exercise that power if it is independ-
ent of the transactions giving rise to the suit.42 Though the district
court found that the board of Booth, Inc. was independent,43 the court
of appeals held that because Jack Booth and LNFC could control the
election of all members of the board,4 it could not be independent.45
Thus, it vacated the district court's approval of the proposed settlement.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Clark relied heavily
on the reasoning of cases in which the demand requirement is ex-
cused.46 The court did not, however, consider any factors that might
distinguish excuse-of-demand cases from settlement cases. It also ig-
nored the relevant standard of appellate review: whether the trial court
abused its discretion in approving or disapproving the proposed com-
promise.4' According to the court:
position by virtue of Jack Booth's and LNFC's combined vote. Clark II, 625 F.2d at 52-53 n.4.
See infra notes 54 60, 65-68 and accompanying text.
38. "All of the evidence suggests to me that the settlement was rather the result of hard
bargaining between the parties." Clark 1, 79 F.R.D. at 652-53.
39. See id at 648-52; infra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
40. Clark II, 625 F.2d at 53 (emphasis added).
41. Id at 52. It is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit first characterized the derivative
claims as belonging to the plaintiff/appellants, rather than to Booth, Inc.; the court corrected itself
later in the same paragraph. Id See mpra note II; in/a note 104.
42. Clark II, 625 F.2d at 52.
43. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
44. See spra note 37.
45. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 54-80 and accompanying text.
47. "Great weight is accorded [the trial court judge's] views because he is exposed to the
litigants, and iheir strategies, positions and proofs. He is aware of the expense and possible legal
bars to success. Simply stated, he is on the firing line and can evaluate the action accordingly."
Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30,34 (3d Cir. 1971). In Young v. Katz, 447
F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1971), a case cited in Clark I, the Fifth Circuit quoted approvingly from
Neuwirth v. Allen, 338 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1964), in which the Second Circuit stated that in approving
or rejecting a settlement proposal, "[t]he action of the District Court is presumptively right, and
will not be set aside unless clearly shown to have been wrong." 447 F.2d at 432-33. Accord
Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975); Flinn v. FMC
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The board's conflict of interest could not be cured by judicial ap-
proval of the settlement terms. "Fairness," "reasonableness," and
"adequacy" in this context connote only that the terms fall within a
range of magnitude that the directors, in the exercise of their business
judgment, could legitimately accept. This 'range of reasonableness'
• ..plainly may encompass terms that, while apparently 'fair,' may
nonetheless have suffered from incestuous negotiation. It is indeed
for this very reason that we bifurcate our review of derivative settle-
ments... by focusing on conflicting interests independently of the
terms themselves. Our holding pretermits review of whether the
terms actually negotiated were "reasonable" in relation to the claims
surrendered. That question will arise, if ever, only when this case is
settled by parties unbeholden to the alleged wrongdoers.
48
The Clark holding requires a court to reject a settlement proposal
when it finds a mere possibility of fraud or collusion in the settlement
negotiations.49 This possibility is automatically established when a
board of directors is not independent.50 Because any group of stock-
holders controlling a majority of the shares can control the entire board
in most states, Clark will allow a derivative plaintiff effectively to pre-
vent a corporation from settling its claims by merely naming the con-
trolling shareholders as defendants.51 Thus, the Clark doctrine will
greatly reduce the number of in-court settlements.52 If the Clark
court's holding actually does protect aggrieved corporations more than
the traditional settlement analysis, it could be argued that this benefit
outweighs the costs inherent in discouraging in-court settlements.
5 3
Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448,454-55 (2d Cir. 1974); United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers
Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 1971).
48. Clark II, 625 F.2d at 54. The Clark 11court did not fully explain what it meant by its
holding. It noted that when the board is independent of the transactions giving rise to the deriva-
tive suit, it is empowered to negotiate and approve settlement terms that will bind the corporation,
subject to judicial approval of the settlement proposal. However, when a board is non-independ-
'ent, under the Clark II court's analysis it lacks the power to bind the corporation, so that no
matter what compromise this board may negotiate and ratify, it cannot effectuate an in-court
settlement and the attendant surrender of the corporation's legal claims. See generally Haudek,
The Settlement and Approval of Stockholders'Actions--Part II. The Settlement, 23 Sw. LJ. 765,
770, 799 (1969).
49. See supra notes 41-45, 48 and accompanying text; infra notes 140-42 and accompanying
text.
50. See Clark II, 625 F.2d at 53-54.
51. See supra note 13.
52. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
53. The principle that public policy favors the settlement rather than litigation of legal claims
is well established. See, eg., Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910); Newman v.
Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 692 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972); Norman v. McKee, 290 F.
Supp. 29,32 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aj?'d, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971);
see also Haudek, supra note 48, at 793.
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However, if this holding does not provide benefits to offset the reduc-
tion in derivative settlements, it should be overturned.
H. THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT AND THE DERIVATIVE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS
A. The Demand Requirement.
In vesting power to manage the corporation in a board of direc-
tors, the legislature necessarily assumes that the board members will
use their independent business judgment to further the interests of the
corporation and not to further their own personal interests. 54 As long
as board members exercise "disinterested" judgment in directing the
corporation's affairs, courts defer to their decisions and will not inter-
fere with their actions.55
In deference to the statutory authority vested in the board of direc-
tors to manage the corporation, Rule 23.1 requires that a stockholder
demand that the board act to vindicate an alleged corporate cause of
action before the stockholder pursues it on a derivative basis.56 The
demand informs the board of the corporation's alleged claim and gives
the board the opportunity to control the litigation as it controls the cor-
poration's other affairs.57 Rule 23.1 thus requires a complaining stock-
holder to exhaust intracorporate remedies before invoking the
extraordinary judicial interference with the corporate structure that
54. See, ag., Clark I, 625 F.2d at 52 (citing Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 58-61 (2d Cir,
1980)); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (DeL Ch. 1980); Note, Business Judgment Rule,
supra note 13, at 601.
55. In Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
926-27 (1979), the court stated:
[Clourts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be
essentially business judgments. The authority and responsibilities vested in corporate
directors both by statute and decisional law proceed on the assumption that inescapably
there can be no available objective standard by which the correctness of every corporate
decision may be measured, by the courts or otherwise. Even if that were not the case, by
definition the responsibility for business judgments must rest with the corporate direc-
tors; their individual capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for the dis-
charge of that responsibility. Thus, absent evidence of bad faith or fraud... the courts
must and properly should respect their determinations.
See alo Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903); Note, Demand
and Standing Requirements, supra note 12. at 171. Such business judgments include the determi-
nation of whether or not a corporation should pursue its legal claims. See In re Penn Central Sec.
Litig., 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (E.D. Pa. 19W3); Note, SpecialLitigation Committees & Yhe Businessr
Judgment Rule, 14 CoNN. L. Rev. 193, 195-96 (1981). See supra note 16; infra notes 60-62 and
accompanying text.
56. See supra note 12. For the text of Rule 23.1, see supra note 5.
57. See Note, DemandandStandingRequirements, supra note 12, at 171-72; see also, United
Copper See. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917); Corbus v. Alaska Tread-
well Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 462 (1903).
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necessarily occurs when a stockholder maintains an action derivatively
against the wishes of the board.58
When the stockholder makes the required demand, the board may
assume control of the suit; it may take no action and allow the com-
plaining stockholder to proceed derivatively or it may reject the de-
mand, depriving the stockholder of the power to maintain the suit.5 9 If
the board is independent of the transactions that give rise to the suit,
courts will review its decision under the deferential standard of the
business judgment rule.6° Thus, before a corporation is embroiled in
litigation that may impair its ability to function,6' the board can termi-
nate "strike suits"'62 and other suits that do not serve the interests of the
corporation.
-In some cases, however, the corporation's claim will be -against
members of the board of directors. 63 In such cases, even when it is in
the corporation's true interest to sue some or all of its directors or menr-
bers, it is unlikely that board members will make an unbiased judg-
ment about the merits of suing themselves or their co-directors on the
corporation's behalf.64 Recognizing the realities of corporate manage-
ment and the limitations of the statutory assumption that board mem-
bers will act with personal disinterest for the independent benefit of
their corporation and its stockholders,65 courts excuse the demand re-
58. The necessity for judicial intervention arises when a demand is required but not made, or
when a demand is made and rejected by the board. ,See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated
,C6pper Co., 244 U.S. 261,263-64 (1917),quotedin note 16 spra; Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450,
460-61 (1881); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1160 (Ist Cir. 1977); Leffv. CIP Corp., 540 F. Supp.
857, 868 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Colan v. Monumental Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1023, 1027 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
infra note 68.
59. See Note, Demand and Standing Requirements supra note 12, at 171-72; inf'a notes 65-68
and accompanying text.
60. See generally Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,478,480,485 (1979); United Copper Sec. Co.
v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57-62
(2d Cir. 1980); Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 809 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857
(1977); Note, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 13, at 600-01.
61. See Cox, Searchingfor the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of
Zapata andtheALl Project, 1982 DuKE LJ. 959, 960; Note, Special Litigation Committees & The
Budiness Judgment Rule, 14 CoNN. L. REv. 196 n.15, 200.
62. A "strike suit" is a frivolous derivative claim brought by a shareholder for the purpose of
enticing the corporation to pay the shareholder and/or his attorney to drop the suit. For a discus-
sion of the classic strike suit, see Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation The Strike Suit, 34
CoLUM. L. REv. 1308 (1934). See iifra notes 82-85, and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 11.
64. See, eg., Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Cathedral Estates, Inc.
v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955)); Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491,
494 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), quoted in Clark II, 625 F.2d at 53. The obvious bias of the board in such
cases encourages courts to be lenient in excusing the demand requirement. See, e.g., deHaas v.
Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970); Note, Demand and Standing Require-
ments, supra note 12, at 170.
65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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quirement where a complaining stockholder alleges, with particular-
ity,"s facts demonstrating that the board would not seriously consider
pursuit of the claims against its members. 67 In such cases, courts will
allow the complaining shareholder to maintain the action derivatively,
without first requiring the shareholder to make a demand. 68
The board may regain its power to control its legal claims, how-
ever, by establishing anew its independence. 69 A board can recapture
66. See, ag., Leff v. CIP Corp., 540 F. Supp. 857, 868 (S.D. Ohio 1982); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 23.1, quoted in supra note 5.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55, 63-64. Courts have not provided a consistent
definition of what constitutes sufficient "futility" to excuse the demand requirement. "'[Probably
the most straightforward approach is to admit frankly that it lies with the sound discretion of the
court to determine the necessity for a demand.' 3B J. MooRE, MOORE's FEDE.RAL PRACTICE, 23.-
1.19 at 254 (2d ed. 1974)." Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See Note,
Demand and Standing Requirementr, supra note 12, at 173-82; Note, Business Judgment "ule, supra
note 13, at 605-07.
The majority view, however, is that the mere naming of members of a board as defendants is
an insufficient reason to excuse the demand. "To allow one shareholder to incapacitate an entire
board of directors merely by leveling charges against them gives too much leverage to dissident
shareholders." Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869
(1980); see also In re Kafiffman Mut. Fund Actions, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Clark I, 79 F.RLD. at
649; c. Note, Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 12, at 173-74. The Clark court,
however, stated that "[w]here as here, the controlling shareholders are named defendants, demand
'futility" is presumed .... We need not now decide whether, given the dynamics of Mr. Booth's
and LNFC's respective shareholdings and litigation interests, Booth's directors lawfully could
compromise those counts in which Mr. Booth is not named." Clark II, 625 F.2d at 53, 54 n.6
(emphasis added). But see Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980) ("It]he rationale of
the cases holding that demand must be made even if the directors have been or may be made
defendants, is not that the directors canpreclude suit despite being defendants, but rather that they
might cause the corporation topw-sue the suit despite being defendants").
68. See ClarkII, 625 F.2d at 53-54; Note, Demand and Standing Requirement, supra note 12,
at 172.
When a stockholder does make a demand on the board of directors, the board may reject the
demand. However, such a decision by a non-independent board will not receive the protection of
the business judgment rule. As is the case when the demand is excused, the facts necessary to
support a finding that a board is incompetent to reject the demand are dependent upon the degree
of control exercised on the board by the alleged wrongdoers. However, some courts have requireA
a lesser showing of non-independence in order to strip the board of the power to reject the de-
mand than is required to excuse the demand; one court has rejected this distinction. Compare
Clark!!, 625 F.2d at 54 n.5 (citing Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980)), and Heit v.
Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1162 n.6 (1st Cir. 1977) with Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 785-86 (3d Cir.),,
cert. dented, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982). See Note, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 13, at 606-08;
Note, Demand and Standing Requfremen.t, supra note 12, at 193-98.
69. "At first blush, it would seem anomalous that corporate directors could tardily and pe-
remptorily intervene to extinguish shareholder derivative actions, over the plaintiffs' heads and
despite their objections. But while the propriety of such intervention may be questioned, the
power can not be." Clark!!f, 625 F.2d at 52; see also Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (D.
Conn. 1981), rev'don othergrounds, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982); Winkleman v. General Motors
Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504,514 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text;supra notes
54-55 and accompanying text.
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its independent status through a change in its composition;70 however,
in recent years the most common means has been through the creation
of a special litigation committee (SLC). An SLC is a subcommittee of
the board, comprised of members untainted by the shareholder's
claims, and vested by the board with its statutory power to control the
derivative suit.71 The SLC is now widely used in derivative litigation
and has repeatedly received judicial approval.72
The SLC conducts an investigation into the merits of the deriva-
tive suit and reports to the board with its recommendations. 73 When an
SLC's recommendations are challenged in court, in all jurisdictions ex-
cept Delaware, if a court finds that the SLC is independent and that it
conducted a good faith and thorough investigation, the court will re-
view the committee's recommendations under the deferential standard
of the business judgment rule.74 This deferential review of SLC recom-
mendations has been criticized because SLCs invariably recommend
termination of derivative suits75
70. See Brody v. Chemical Bank, 482 F.2d 1111, 1114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1104
(1973); Nelson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 399 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Independ-.
ent Investor Protective League v. Saunders, 64 F.R.D. 564, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
71. See generally Cox, supra note 61, at 959; Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Commit-
tee.s To Terminate Shareholder Derivative Suits, 35 U. Mwmu L REv. 1 (1980); Note, Special Lti
gation Committees & the Business Judgment Rule, 14 CONN. L. REv. 193 (1981); Note, Business
Judgment Rule supra note 13, at 600.
72. See, eg., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir.
1979), cer daied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data .Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Grossman v. Johnson, 89 F.R.D. 656 (D. Mass.
198 1), af§'d, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 85 (1982); Watts v. Des Moines Register
and Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-
89 (DeL 1981). The SLC offers a great deal of protection to the corporation; however, because a
biased board has the opportunity to carefully choose the members of the SLC, the committee is
likely to have a "structural bias" against derivative suits and great sympathy for the board. See
Cox, supra note 61, at 962; Note, Business Judgment Rue, supra note 13, at 619-22.
73. See, eg., Cox, supra note 61, at 961-62 n.9; Steinberg, supra note 71, at 2.
74. See, e&g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
489 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727-30 (8th Cir. 1979), cer denied, 444
U.S. 1017 (1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
If the court does not find that the SLC is independent, it will not respect the committee's
recommendations. Courts will generally ignore the more subtle form of bias that is part of the
committee members' general attitude as corporate directors, see infra text accompanying note 75.
The willingness of courts to disregard an SLC's "structural bias" has been cogently criticized. See
Cox,supra note 61, at 962-63, 1007-11; Note, ausiness JudgmentRule, supra note 13, at 600-03, 601
n.14, 616-33. Nevertheless, except for the Zapata case in Delaware, see infra notes 76-80 and
accompanying text, and possibly Clark II, see supra note 67 and accompanying text, there has
been no indication of a heightened judicial concern about the effects of structural bias on the
decisions of SLCs. But 5f Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
75. See Cox, supra note 61, at 962-63.
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In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,76 the Delaware Supreme Court at
least partially responded to such criticism by establishing a more rigor-
ous standard for review of SLC recommendations. In addition to a
court's review of the independence of an SLC and the thoroughness of
its good faith investigation, the court may also apply "its own in-
dependent business judgment" to determine whether the SLC's recom-
mendations "would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder
grievance deserving of further consideration in the corporation's inter-
est."'77 In explaining this deviation from the normal application of the
business judgment rule to the decisions of SLCs, 78 the Zapata court
stated: "We recognize the danger ofjudicial overreaching but the alter-
natives seem to us to be outweighed by the fresh view of a judicial
outsider."7 9 Thus, in Delaware, the decisions of independent SLCs will
not necessarily receive the same judicial deference accorded the deci-
sions of an independent board of directors.80
B. The Derivative Settlement Process.
1. The Court's Role Rule 23.1 requires court approval of deriva-
tive suit settlements primarily because the motives of all parties to such
a settlement are suspect.8' Many factors may prompt a party to accept
an inadequate settlement without regard for the true interests of the
corporation on behalf of which the suit is brought. Members of the
board may support an inadequate settlement to shield themselves from
substantial personal liability or to avoid the revelation during addi-
tional discovery, or at trial of potentially embarassing facts about board
actions. The plaintiff may also accept a settlement for personal re-
wards. He may have initiated the derivative suit only because he
thought that the defendants would pay him to drop it.82 The plaintiff's
counsel may settle the suit if the settlement will bring him attorney's
fees proportionately larger than those he might receive after a success-
76. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
77. Id. at 789. The precise meaning and consequent aspect of the Zapata holding is unclear.
The Zapala court clearly sought to establish a more rigorous standard of review of SLC recom-
mendations. However, this seemingly heightened standard is intertwined with language both rem-
iniscent of the deferential business judgment rule and ambiguous with regard to the nature of the
overriding public policy concern that will allow a Delaware court to disregard a reasonable and
well-supported SLC recommendation to terminate a suit. See Cox, upra nota 61, at 976-94,
78. See xmpra note 74 and accompanying text.
79. 430 A.2d at 788.
80. See i at 787; supra notes 59-60 and accmpanying text.
81. See McLaughlin, Capacity of Phaznt-Stockhold r to Tnrnate a Stockholder's Suit, 46
YALE LJ. 421,435 (1936); see also Birnbaum v. Birrell, 17 F.RD. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
82. See supra note 62.
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ful adjudication of the derivative claims.8 3 Although the derivative
plaintiff is the party that initiates the suit,s4 courts routinely approve
derivative settlements over the plaintiff's vehement objections.8 5
Thus, when reviewing a settlement proposal, courts act as guardi-
ans of the corporation's interest and as third parties to the settlement
agreement.8 6 A court's presence cannot always thwart parties deter-
mined to defraud the corporation;8 7 however, by acting as if it were an
"independent board of directors" 8 in judging the merits of a proposed
settlement, a court can provide substantial protection against such ac-
tion.89 In fulfilling its role as independent arbiter of the fairness of the
settlement, the court must closely analyze the case at hand.9° By the
time the parties present a derivative settlement proposal to the court for
review, the court will usually be familiar with the litigation and the
83. See, e.g., Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Prandini v.
National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977); Women's Comm. for Equal Employment
Opportunity v. National Broadcasting Co., 76 F.R.D. 173, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); cf. Haudek, supra
note 48, at 768.
84. See Haudek, supra note 48, at 767-70.
85. For cases concerning the acceptability to a court of a proposed settlement to which the
derivative suit plaintiff objects, see Clark II, 625 F.2d at 51; Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169,
1173 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 897, 899-
900 (2d Cir. 1972); Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 141 F.2d 285, 287 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 739 (1944); Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility, 87 F.R.D. 15, 18 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aj'd,
661 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1981).
86. See, eg., Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832
(1953); Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 141 F.2d'285, 288 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739
(1944); Boggess v. Hogan, 410 F. Supp. 433, 437 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Zerkle v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron
Co., 52 F.R.D. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29,32 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
at'd, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970).
87. For instance, in Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the plaintiff
collaterally attacked a settlement agreement approved by a state court, requesting that the settle-
ment be set aside because of the alleged conduct of certain parties, conduct of which the state
court had been unaware. See Id at 175-76. But f Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953) (implying that the mere presence of the court as a third
party to the compromise precludes fraud or collusion). Haudek, supra note 48, at 771, calls Mas-
terson an "extreme" view-, it fails to take into account the ingenuity of litigants in overburdened
courts.
88. Haudek, supra note 48, at 792.
89. See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
90. In the derivative settlement process, a court has neither a duty nor a right to make con-
clusions of law or fact regarding the merits of the corporation's claims. See, eg., City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1974). However, the court must be sufficiently
informed of the facts and law of the case to make and articulate an intelligent judgment about the
merits of the settlement proposal. Unless the "[c]ourt has available to it either hard facts or a
rational explanation for its inability to discover them, it does not know the range of appropriate
settlement and it is flying blind." Weiss v. Chalker, 55 F.R.D. 168, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1169 (5th Cir. 1978); City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 456, 461 (2d Cir. 1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440
F.2d 1079, 1085-86 (2d Cir.), cm denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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parties.91 Furthermore, opponents of the proposed compromise must
be allowed to develop and enter into the record facts supporting their
objections.92 After hearing the evidence, the court will determine
whether to accept the settlement proposal; if it rejects the proposal, it
can often guide the parties to more equitable settlement terms.93
2. he Court's Analysis. In view of the potential for illicit con-
duct in the derivative settlement process,94 the traditional analysis of
settlement proposals requires the reviewing court first to determine
whether the settlement negotiations were conducted in "good faith"
and were free from "fraud or collusion."95 Although a court reviewing
a settlement proposal should, logically, be more interested in the results
achieved rather than in the conduct of the negotiations, 96 courts seem
willing to reject a proposed settlement tainted by fraud "no matter how
acceptable it may otherwise appear. '97 However, few cases explain
what conduct is sufficiently fraudulent or collusive to compel a court to
reject a settlement proposal without also considering its fairness, ade-
quacy and reasonableness. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Clark apparently
intended to follow the traditional analysis of whether a proposed settle-
ment is tainted by fraud or collusion.99 The circuit court did not, how-
ever, find that the obvious potential for the board's conflict of
interest'00 had in fact materialized into fraud or collusion in the negoti-
ations;101 indeed, the district court had found that the plaintiffs failed to
show actual fraud or collusion in the negotiations. 0 2 Rather, guided
91. In ClarkI, the district court repeatedly emphasized its familiarity with the litigation, the
record of which filled approximately thirty thousand pages. See 79 F.R.D. at 643-44, 650, 652.
92. For instance, in Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1975), and in Cohen v.
Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1942), the appellate courts reversed the lower courts' ap-
provals of settlement proposals because the lower courts failed to allow objectors to state their
cases
93. See Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1978); see also In re General Motors Corp.
Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1126 n.30 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
94. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
95. See, ag., Flinn v. FMC Corp. 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
967 (1976); Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1971); In re Montgomery County Real
Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 315 (D. Md. 1979); Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 50
F.R.D. 473, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
96. See Haudek, supra note 48, at 771.
97. Id at 772.
98. Haudek cites three examples of fraudulent and collusive conduct: a bribe promised to
the plaintifs representative; a stockholder's derivative action "planted" by the defendants; and an
excessive fee for plaintirs counsel in return for an inadequate settlement. Id.
99. Clazrk II, 625 F.2d at 54.
100. See supra note 37; .pra text accompanying note 44.
101. See supra text accompanying note 40.
102. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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by the reasoning of cases excusing the demand requirement, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the mere possibility of fraud
or collusion as evidenced by a board's non-independence compelled
the court, as a matter of law, to reject the proposed compromise with-
out considering the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the settle-
ment terms. 1
0 3
The Clark analysis is unprecedented.' °4 The few relevant reported
cases indicate that only textbook cases of fraud or collusion have
prompted courts to reject a settlement proposal without otherwise con-
sidering the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the proposed
103. See supra notes 40, 48-50 and accompanying text. Thus, the Fifth Circuit never focused
on the actual conduct of the negotiations. Rather, the court was preoccupied with its suspicions
about what the negotiations might have been like.
104. The Clark court's deviation from the traditional standards of the derivative settlement
process is best illustrated by two cases in which courts were confronted with settlement proposals
negotiated by non-independent boards. In Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490,
495 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), a settlement was negotiated after a favorable decision for the plaintiffs, but
before judgment had been entered. The inkelman court state&-
It would seem that where the corporation's affairs are under the control of a board of
directors, the adequacy of the settlement of a judgment obtained in a stockholder's ac-
tion would be for the board to decide, if the board is disinterested and not involved in
the litigation .... But in the present case there would be a serious obstacle to such a
course, once judgment is entered, because most of the present board of-directors of Gen-
eral Motors Corporation are defendants herein and they control large blocks of stock,
although not a majority of the stock. U.S. Lines Inc. et al. v. U.S. Lines Co. et al., 2 Cir.,
96 F.2d 148, 152. However, even in such a situation, I do not believe that Rule 23(c)
[predecessor to Rule 23.1] would bar this court, if it were asked to do so, from itself
inquiring into the matter and expressing views-as to the adequacy of a proposed settle-
ment of a judgment, after notice to all stockholders. That would be an aid to the admin-
istration of justice; it would assist in properly ending the litigation; and the Court's
sanction of the settlement would make less likely the institution of further stockholdees
actions based on the alleged inadequacy of the settlement itself.
Id at 495. The case cited by the Winke/man court, United States Lines, Inc. v. United States
Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1938), also addressed the question whether an interested board
could settle a derivative suit. In United States Lines, the court rejected the settlement, reasoning:
[We are not] satisfied that the value of the consideration offered for the discontinuance
[of the derivative suit] is sufficient to justify the [approval of the settlement proposal]
.... We do not say that the stock owned by the defendants could not be voted in favor
of the settlement, but hold that the settlement effected by a majority consisting mainly of
the defendants who were in control of the corporation should not be sanctioned without
clear proof that it was advantageous to the corporation and its stockholders. We are not
satisfied that such proof has been furnished by the defendants. "
Id at 152. Thus, in neither Wmkelman nor United States Lines were the board members "in-
dependent" of the transaction giving rise to the derivative suits; in fact, in WiZkelman the defend-
ants had already been found liable. The courts did not question the propriety of the board of
directors' exercise of their power to negotiate and bind their corporation to a settlement; in each
case, the court reached its decision by examining the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the
proposal
Two Fifth Circuit decisions cited by the court in Clark II, Miller v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 559 F.2d 426,428-29 (5th Cir. 1977), and Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431,432-33 (5th Cir. 1971),
do not support the Clark court's holding that a non-independent board may not settle a derivative
suit. Rather, the two cases stand for the simple proposition that a court must search for fraud and
collusion in settlement negotiations. Neither case specifies the precise nature of that search.
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terms.105 The well-settled legal principle that a court must not become
a party to illegitimate conduct through judicial enforcement of illegal
agreements justifies a court's searching inquiry into an allegedly fraud-
ulent or collusive settlement.1 o6 If there is sufficient direct or circum-
stantial evidence of such misconduct, the court must disapprove the
proposed compromise.
105. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. Courts will expend considerable effort to
ensure that a settlement proposal is not tainted by fraud or collusion. See, e.g., Alleghany Corp. v.
Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (conducting in-depth review of circumstantial evidence
to determine if agreement is possibly fraudulent or collusive). Nevertheless, courts must often
approve settlements in questionable circumstances. In In re General Motors Corp. Engine In-
terchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979), a plaintiff asserted that
it was inadequately represented in settlement negotiations. The court indicated, in dicta, that even
if the plaintiff were wrongly excluded and the settlement negotiations were therefore "improper,"
the district court could have approved the proposed settlement if the proponents of the settlement
had been able to "bear the heavier burden of establishing fairness by clear and convincing evi-
dence." Id at 1126 n.30.
In American Employers' Ins. Co. v. King Resources Co., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 161 (Callaghan)
(D. Colo. 1975), a defendant/intervenor in a class action asserted that it had been inadequately
represented in settlement negotiations and thus could not be bound by the settlement agreement.
The court held that "as to the relative benefits which the various individuals and groups within the
defendant class are to receive from the settlement, there are obvious conflicts .... [T]hese con-
flicts and any disparity in benefits go to the 'fairness' of the settlement .... [citation omitted]
Mhepom.'bilio, of unfairness or collusion does not mean, as a matter of law, that the court may
not consider the settlement plan. . . ." Id at 165 (emphasis in original).
Thus, in both General Motors and King Resources, the settlement negotiations were not as
"proper" as they would have been if all the parties had participated therein. However, because
there was no showing of actual fraud or collusion, the courts evaluated the settlement proposals
solely on the basis of the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the proposed terms.
106. This principle originates from the law of contracts, where "It]he policy of the law is
clear-if the contract is for an illegal purpose, the court may not lend its aid to enforce it, but must
leave the parties where it finds them." Bauman & Vogel, C.P.A. v. Del Vecchio, 423 F. Supp.
1041, 1044 (E.D. Pa. 1976). "This is done, not to punish one party [to an illicit contract] more
severely than another, but to maintain the dignity of the court and for reasons of general public
policy." Manning v. Metal Stamping Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (N.D. I1. 1975), ajed, 530
F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1976). See United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Levy v. Kansas
City, Kan., 168 F. 524, 525-26 (8th Cir. 1909); BRooMs LEGAL MAxims 125-27, 690-93 (6th ed.
1868).
The analogy from the law of contracts to the derivative settlement process is clear and invit-
ing. The primary purpose of the Rule 23.1 requirement of judicial approval of settlement propos-
als is to protect against fraudulent or collusive settlement agreements. See, e.g., Bimbaum v.
BirreU, 17 F.R.D. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. Thus,
if a derivative settlement proposal is tainted by fraud or collusion, a court must not lend the
judicial hand that is necessary to effectuate the settlement of the corporation's claims. While it
seems logical to assume that any fraud or collusion perpetrated in settlement negotiations would
result in a reduced recovery for the corporation, questions regarding the merits of the terms of a
fraudulent-or collusive settlement proposal are in fact irrelevant. For in view of the overriding
needs to protect the integrity of the judiciary and the public policy behind Rule 23.1, even if the
proposed settlement could be found to be fair, adequate and reasonable, a court would have to
reject it if the negotiations leading thereto were tainted by fraud or collusion.
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This rationale does not, however, explain the Clark court's refusal
to affirm the trial court's approval of a settlement proposal simply be-
cause there was the potential for fraud and collusion. In Clark, the
plaintiff failed to prove that the potential conflicts of interest had in fact
materialized into fraud or collusion; 10 7 thus, under the standard test, 0 8
'the Clark court should have affirmed the trial court's findings that the
settlement was free of fraud and was fair, adequate, and reasonable.
In reviewing a settlement proposal under the fair, adequate, and
reasonable standard, 1 9 the court's most important task is to balance
the strength of the corporation's claims against the terms of the pro-
posed compromise. 110 The court must first evaluate the likelihood that
the corporation would prevail at trial' by weighing the risks and bur-
dens of establishing both liability and damages in light of the uncer-_
tainties of law and the facts of the case."i2 If the corporation's claims
107. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
109. See, ag., Miller v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977); Clark 1, 79
F.R.D. at 648; Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), atd, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); Zerkle v. Cleveland-
Cliffs Iron Co., 52 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
110. See, eg., Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S.-414, 424-25 (1968); In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Traffic Executive Ass'n, 627
F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir. 1980); Sblensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 1978); City of Detroit
v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448,455 (2d Cir. 1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d
1079, 1085 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 50
F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Haude, supra note 48, at 773.
111. See generally Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1968); In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Traffic Executives Ass'n,
627 F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir. 1980); Shlenskyv. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 1978); City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp, 495 F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir. 1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
440 F.2d 1079, 1085 (2d Cir.), cen, denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 473, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Haudek, supra note 48, at 773.
The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure set forth the following criteria
for the court.
In evaluating a proposed settlement, the court shall place primary emphasis on the fol-
lowing factors: (1) the size of the best possible net recovery and, if calculable, the prob-
able net recovery at trial, discounted in each case by the risk to the corporation of an
adverse judgment, in relation to the net value of the proposed settlement; (2) the impact
of delay on the value of the recovery if litigation were to continue; (3) the value of any
corrective measures required by the settlement or undertaken as a result of litigation; (4)
the deterrent impact of the settlement with respect to the conduct in question; (5) the
adverse effects, if any, of the continuation of the litigation on the corporation;. and (6) the
availability of other plaintiffs to intervene and prosecute the action, or a portion thereof,
in a superior fashion. The proponents of a settlement shall bear the burden of proving
that it is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
PRINCIPLES OF CoPoRATE GOVENANCE AND STRucTruR RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 7.04(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE].
112. See, eg., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212-16 (5th Cir.
1981), cet. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2283 (1982); Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir.), cet.
denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1385-87
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), 417'd, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
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are viable, the court then establishes a range of possible recovery that
the corporation could realize at trial and compares this to the proposed
settlement terms.113 If the plaintiffs are very likely to succeed, it should
be difficult, if not impossible, for a party to justify a settlement that falls
below the probable range of recovery;114 if the cause of action seems
relatively frivolous, however, the court may approve a much smaller
settlement. "5
Some courts have stated that in the settlement process, a court
must not substitute its own business judgment for that of the parties. 116
This is an unrealistic admonition; to ealuate the merits of proposed
settlement terms, the court must exercise, its own legal and business
judgment." 7 For instance, in approving the settlement proposal, the
district court in Clark evaluated the factual and legal hurdles that the
plaintiffs would have faced at trial; the complexity and length of a trial;
the costs of trial to Booth, Inc.; the possible loss to Booth, Inc. of in-
demnification costs for those defendants that had waived indemnifica-
tion in the settlement proposal; and the possible conflicts of interest
between the attorneys on both sides that could have resulted ultimately
in the disqualification of some attorneys, postponement of the trial, or
Among the factors considered by courts are the complexity and the probable expense and
duration of the litigation; the costs to the corporation of indemnifying the defendant directors; the
difficulty of collecting a judgment; and the litigation's burden on the court. See general, Protec-
tive Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414,424-25 (1968); Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147 (3d
Cir. 1978); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123-25 (8th Cir. 1975); Inre
Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 315-18 (D. Md. 1975); Clark I,
79 F.R.D. at 648-52; City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp, 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1385-89 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aJ'd, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); Milstein v. Werner, 57 F.R.D. 515, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); see also Note, Factors Considered in Determining the Fainess of a Settlement, 68 Nw. U.L.
R-v. 1146 (1974).
113. See, eg., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir. 1974); Clark I, 79
F.R.D. at 651.
114. Though it seems elementary, courts sometimes find it necessary to remind litigants that a
settlement represents a compromise between the parties: as the quid pro quo for not having to
bear the burdens of litigation, plaintiff-stockholders will not obtain the maximum possible recov-
ery for their corporation and the defendants will not have an opportunity to exonerate themselves
in court. See, ag., Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility, 87 F.R.D. 15, 19 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Perco-
dani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 50 F.R.D. 473, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
115. City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974).
116. See, eag., McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416, 426-27 (7th Cir. 19717)
(citing United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647,655 (7th Cir.
1971)).
117. "It is perhaps the basis of the view denying a free hand to an independent directorate that
a court may not safely conclude, in the absence of becoming a third party to the compromise....
[citation omitted] that the directors are indeed acting independently and that a settlement lacks all
taint." Bimbaum v. Birrell, 17 F.R.D. 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See supra notes 86-93 and ac-
companying text.
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dismissal of the case.' 18 Thus, although a court's approval of a settle-
ment proposal may implicitly vindicate the business judgment of the
parties,' 19 the numerous factors it must consider in evaluating the mer-
its of a settlement proposal make it necessary for the court to exercise
its own business and legal judgment.12 0 By exercising its judgment and
undertaking a stringent review of the settlement's terms, the court pro-
tects the corporation from unfair dealing by any party to the suit.
III. THE SEARCH FOR A PARITY OF REASONING
The Clark decision presents the question whether the potential for
fraud or collusion in settlement negotiations caused by the lack of an
independent board of directors should preclude approval of an other-
wise fair settlement. In demand requirement cases, a similar potential
for fraud or collusion prevents the board from exercising its usual role
in managing the affairs of the corporation.121 An examination of the
two types of cases, however, demonstrates that the "parity of reason-
ing" on which the Clark court relied does not exist.
In demand requirement cases, the court balances the corporation's
right to obtain judicial redress for its alleged injuries in the face of
board opposition against the board's right to manage. Neither right is
absolute. If the board is independent, the court requires the demand
and defers to the board's decision regardless of the suit's merits, be-
cause an independent board is presumed to have made a fair evalua-
tion of the suit.12 If the board is not independent, however, the court
excuses the demand requirement and will not defer to the board's opin-
ion of the suit's merits because the board, lacking independence, is pre-
sumed to be unable to provide unbiased guidance for the
corporation.123 If the court were to bind the corporation to the decision
118. See Clark 1, 79 F.R.D. at 650-53, 656-57;see alo Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp.;
79 F.R.D. 658 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (denying motion to disqualify corporate counsel based on alleged
conflict of interest). The district court in Clark estimated that Booth, hc. would have incurred
additional costs of $500,000 to $900,000 had the claims been litigated. See Clark 1, 79 F.R.D. at
652, 656.
119. When a court rejects proposed settlement terms, it rejects the business judgment of the
parties. The court may also indicate to the parties what terms it might find acceptable, and it
could then be argued that the court has thereby substituted its own business judgment for that of
the parties. However, before the recommended terms can be formally proposed to the court, the
parties must return to the negotiating table and exercise their own business judgment to determine
whether it is to their advantage to adopt the recommendation. Thus, the corporation and the
defendants retain their power to determine the specifics of the settlement proposal.
120. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
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of a non-independent board, it would risk the loss of a viable corporate
cause of action.124 Allowing the suit to proceed, however, risks the con-
tinuation of a strike suit.12
Recognizing this risk, courts allow the corporation to protect itself
against strike suits by creating a special litigation committee that can
recommend dismissal of the suit even if the full board cannot.126 The
committee is ostensibly independent, and it is empowered to study the
suit and to recommend its continuation or dismissal. The board re-
gains its right to manage the corporation by using the committee to
reestablish its independence, which courts regard as a guarantee that
the board will fulfill its statutory duty to manage the corporation in an
unbiased manner. Recognizing, however, that the directors' inherent
pro-defendant sympathies may render their technical independence an
inadequate safeguard, courts following Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado27
may also perform an independent analysis of the committee's decision
to ensure that the corporation is treated fairly.128
Even though courts in settlement cases must balance the same con-
siderations that control in demand requirement cases, settlement cases
nevertheless differ from demand cases. In demand cases, if the court
defers to the decision of a biased board, the suit is dismissed, and the
corporation receives nothing. In settlement cases, however, the board
cannot completely frustrate the corporation's rights because the corpo-
ration will receive fair recompense for its alleged injuries. Further-
more, because the court's only alternative in demand cases is to dismiss,
the suit, the court assumes that the plaintiff filed the suit in good faith
and allows the plaintiff to maintain the suit derivatively once the de-
mand has been excused. Inmany cases, however, the corporation's le-
gal claims are frivolous and the plaintiff or his attorney may have filed
the suit primarily for personal gain; thus, the corporation gains nothing
and may lose a great deal from the continued maintenance of the
suit.129 In such a situation, a board of directors should not be pre-
cluded from settling the case with the defendants on behalf of the cor-
124. Technically, another plaintiff could file suit and again demand that the board pursue the
claim on the corporation's behalf. The board, however, would simply reject the demand again.
125. See generato, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784-85, 788 (Del. 1981).
126. See .supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
127. 430 A.2d 779 (DeL 1981).
128. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. Although commentators have questioned
whether Zapata significantly increases the level of the court's review, see Cox, supra note 61, at
1007-11, Zapata stands at least for the proposition that the SLC cannot be completely trusted to
protect the corporation.
129. In Clark I, the district court noted its suspicions that the plaintiff sought personal gain
inute a- it sought to protect the corporation. See 79 F.R.D. at 652, 656.
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poration simply because the board is not independent. By refusing to
allow a non-independent board to act, the court may prevent a fair
settlement and prolong an unfair suit.
Of course, the board may be able to regain its independence by
appointing a special settlement committee (SSC) or, should that prove
impossible, by requesting that the court appoint an unbiased panel to
settle the case. 130 The Clark court alluded to this possibility in a foot-
note to its opinion, 31 and the proposed Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance and Structure, now before the AL1 32 endorse such a course of
action. Although it might seem desirable to require an independent
SSC where the board itself is not independent, closer analysis suggests
that such a requirement would unnecessarily infringe on the board's
statutory duty to manage the corporation.
The requirement of an SSC elevates form over substance because
the justification for appointing an SLC in demand cases has no ana-
logue in settlement cases. In demand cases, the SLC protects the cor-
poration against the influence of biased directors. 133 In settlement
cases, however, such protection is available without the appointment of
an SSC. First, under the pre-Clark test, courts automatically reject any
settlement tainted by collusion.1 34 This rejection prevents a board
from, in effect, settling the case with itself. Second, to guard against
actual and structural bias, the court conducts its own in-depth review of
130. See CORPORATE GovERNANc., mupra note 111, §§ 7.04-7.05.
131. See Clark 11, 625 F.2d at 54 n.6 ("this case [does not] present any issue respecting
whether ... a duly constituted executive committee could have achieved what the directors un-
successfully attempted").
Based on the Clark court's holding and the facts of the case, it is doubtful that the board of
Booth, Inc. could have appointed an SSC or SLC with sufficient independence to satisfy the court.
First, the Clark court's disapproving reference to "structural bias," 625 F.2d at 53, indicates that
the court would not have accepted such bias in an SSC. Second, the board of Booth, Inc. that
attempted to settle the suit consisted primarily of outsiders who were appointed subsequent to the
transaction that gave rise to the suit. See Clark I, 79 F.R.D. at 619; suprp note 36. Until Clark,
the Booth board would have been sufficiently independent to comprise an SLC. See supra notes,
69-74 and accompanying text; cf. Note, Business Judgment arde, supra note 13, at 619-22.
132. See CORPORATE GovEaNANcE, supra note 111, §§ 7.04, 7.05. The proposal before the
ALl cites the Clark case in support of the SSC requirement, see id at 373; however, the proposal
does not address the problems underlying Clark.
133. The adequacy of this protection is suspect; a lack of confidence in the independence of
SLCs prompted the Delaware Supreme Court to mandate review of their decisions in Zapata.
"[W]hen examining the... [SLC] mechanism, potentials for abse must be recognized." 430
A.2d at 785. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. Even though other jurisdictions have
not yet followed Zaaza, its analysis is a step in the right direction. See, ag., Cox, supra note 61, at
982-85. But see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). Furthermore, there is no reason to
believe that SSCs will be freer of structural bias than SLCs.
134. See supra notes 97, 106 and accompanying text.
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the proposed settlement. 135 The court usually has extensive knowledge
of the case from its supervision of discovery.' 36 In addition, all inter-
ested parties may present their case for or against the proposed settle-
ment,1 37 and all parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery
and to gather facts in support of their arguments. 38 The court may
also weigh the independence or bias of the parties in reaching its deter-
mination of the validity of their arguments, and, should the court find
the settlement unfair, it can guide the parties toward an acceptable
agreement.139 Thus, the court can effectively evaluate the settlement
135. See supra notes 81-95, 109-20 and accompanying text.
136. For example, in Clark I the district court noted its familiarity with the case, see supra
note 91, and remarked that the "history of this case has paralleled the creation of the universe."
79 F.R.D. at 643.
137. If no one contests the settlement, the-court will not be able to evaluate the settlement as
thoroughly, see infra note 138, and if all parties were engaged in questionable conduct, the court
might inadvertantly approve an unfair settlement. Although this may be a plausible argument for
requiring an independent board, the Clark case did not present such a situation, the court did not
base its holding on the need to encourage challenges to proposed settlements, and most courts are
not naive when acting as guardian of the corporation's interest. Furthermore, if the courts decided
to require an independent board only when both parties approved the settlement, the parties
might simply settle out of court under Wolf v. Barker. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying
text. Also, if settlement ultimately proved reasonable, having required independence would result
in a deadweight economic loss to the corporation.
138. [In cases] where there are objectors, the court is aided in its task; the proponents can
be expected to present evidence and arguments suggesting that the settlements are within
a 'range of reasonableness' and the objectors will do the same for the contrary position.
By weighing the competing evidence and evaluating the legal arguments, we think the
court should be able to reach a just conclusion.
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 213 (5th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 2283 (1982).
139. One might contend that an independent board would reach a better settlement for the
corporation than a non-independent board, although both settlements might be fair. This conten-
tion lacks merit. As stated by the Fifth Circuit in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., "[ilf
the terms themselves are fair, reasonable and adequate, the district court may. . . assume that
they were negotiated by competent and adequate counsel; in such cases, whether another team of
negotiators might have accomplished a better settlement is a matter equally comprised of conjec-
ture and irrelevance." 643 F.2d at 212; see also Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513
F.2d 114, 125 n.9 (8th Cir. 1975). Furthermore, judicial review of settlement proposals is not and
should not be confined to a mere determination of whether or not the corporation's board is
independent. See Birnbaum v. Birrell, 17 F.R.D. 409,410 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But Sf Susquehanna
Corp. v. Korholz, 84 F.R.D. 316, 321 (N.D. IML 1979). See supra note 104. The court must go
beyond the independence issue in order to determine whether a proposed compromise is in fact
free from fraud and collusion, and is fair, adequate and reasonable. See supra notes 94-120 and
accompanying text. Thus, a court should not assume that the fact that a board is independent
necessarily means that the settlement negotiations were free from fraud or collusion, or that the
settlement terms are fair, adequate and reasonable to the corporation. Nor should a court assume,
as did the Clark! /court, that the fact that a board is not independent necessarily means that ther
negotiations were fraudulent and collusive or that the terms are unfair, inadequate or unreasona-
ble. To make any such assumptions "represent[s] the abdication of judicial discretion rather than
its informed exercise." McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416,422 (7th Cir. 1977).
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and advise the parties in a manner impossible in demand-requirement
cases, which are decided on the bare allegations of the complaint.1t
Other considerations suggest that requiring the board to establish
independence may be counterproductive as well as-unnecessary. If the
board cannot obtain an in-court settlement unless it reestablishes its
independence, either by requiring some of its members to resign and
allowing new disinterested persons to take their place or by requesting
the court to appoint a special panel, the board may simply choose to
settle out of court with the plaintiff as allowed by Woff v. Barkes.14 1
This alternative may be less costly and more attractive than initiating a
mass resignation or transferring the power to settle the suit to a group
of strangers. By requiring an independent board, the Clark court may
simply have given derivative plaintiffs added leverage in pursuing their
own personal gain by demanding out of court settlements. 42 Thus, the
concern for fairness to the corporation that justifies the requirement of
an independent board in demand cases may be totally frustrated by
requiring an independent board in settlement cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
In asserting the existence of a parity of reasoning between demand
requirement cases and settlement cases, the Clark court ignored the
distinctions between those cases. Although the Clark court correctly
suspected the motivations of corporate boards of directors,1 43 the solu-
tion it proposes unnecessarily diminishes the availability of in-court
settlements pursuant to Rule 23.1 while providing little, if any, protec-
tion to corporations. Although the court sought to protect the corpora-
tion's interests, its decision may have exactly the opposite effect by
encouraging out-of-court settlements that principally benefit plaintiffs
140. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
141. 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965). Encouraging such results is
undesirable, and it is doubtful that the inherent limitation of Wolf that an out of court settlement
offers no res judicata effect, see id at 996-97; Cox, supra note 61, at 970-71, will be sufficient to
prevent boards from using out of court settlements to avoid the independence requirement of
Clark.
142. This raises substantial possibilities for abuse in the form of questionable dealings by
plaintiffs' attorneys. Courts have always been suspicious of cases in which the real party in inter-
est seems to be lawyer. For instance, in class actions, courts frown on the simultaneous negotia-
tion of attorney's fees and the amount of damages or other remedies. See, ,g., Mendoza v.
United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015,
1021 n.7 (3d Cir. 1977). The Mendoza court stated:
We cannot indiscriminately assume, without more, that the amount of fees have no influ-
ence on the ultimate settlement obtained for the class when, along with the substantive
remedy issues, it is an active element of negotiation. [citation omitted]
623 F.2d at 1351.
143. "Clark questions director impartiality in any suit against a current control person." Cox,
jupra note 61, at 1002.
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or plaintiffs' counsel. To avoid such a result, the Courts of Appeals for
the Fifth and Eleventh1 " Circuits should overrule Clark at their earli-
est opportunity.
Kenneth W. Kossoff
144. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (1lth Cir. 1981) (holding that deci-
sions of the former Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981 shall be binding as precedent in
the Elventh Circuit).
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